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Price Discovery In Financial Markets:
The Case Of The CAPM
Abstract: We report on experiments of simple, repeated asset markets in two
risky securities and one risk-free security, set up to test the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), which embeds the two most essential principles of modern asset
pricing theory, namely, (i) financial markets equilibrate, (ii) in equilibrium,
risk premia are solely determined by covariance with aggregate risk. Slow, but
steady convergence towards the CAPM is discovered. The convergence process,
however, halts before reaching the actual equilibrium. There is ample evidence
that subjects gradually move up in mean-variance space, in accordance with the
CAPM. Yet, adjustment stops as if the remaining trading time was insufficient
to complete all the transactions that are needed to guarantee improvements in
positions. We conjecture that this is due to subjects’ hesitance in the face of
market thinness. Because the convergence process halts, statistical tests reject
the CAPM.
JEL Classification: G12, C92, D59. Keywords: Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), Experimental Economics, Financial Markets, Equilibrium, Equilibra-
tion.
1 Introduction
In many respects, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe [1964]
and Lintner [1965] is the cornerstone of modern finance. Its decision-theoretic
foundation, mean-variance analysis, has become a major guidance to asset allo-
cation. Its equilibrium restriction provides the most important risk correction
in the evaluation of portfolio performance. It is widely applied to determine
appropriate discount rates in capital budgeting. Asset pricing models with even
greater generality are based on CAPM’s key arguments of optimal portfolio de-
mands and market equilibration, and share its main prediction, namely, that
expected returns increase with the covariation with aggregate risk.
Despite the prestigious theoretical standing of the CAPM (and its more
general offspring), there is far less convincing evidence about its empirical rele-
vance. Fama and French [1992], for instance, discovered a significant, negative
relationship between average returns and covariation with market returns, in
contrast with the prediction in the CAPM of a positive relationship. Frustrated
with the productivity of basic model testing, academic finance has ostensibly
been drifting towards a purely empirical (statistical) approach to modeling asset
prices. E.g., Fama and French [1996], Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam
[1996]. The purpose of this branch of research is to measure average returns,
instead of to test the underlying theory. The resulting measurements have
proven to be very helpful in applied areas, such as capital budgeting and port-
folio performance evaluation. Still, the empirical approach is not entirely data
driven. Theoretical arguments are often appealed to, mostly to provide a rough
indication that the measurements are reasonable. These “reality checks” are
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necessitated by the limited possibilities of replicating the empirical results on
independent samples.
The CAPM rests on very general principles of market behavior which per-
meate modeling in asset pricing theory, namely that financial markets equili-
brate, and that only aggregate risk will be priced in equilibrium. Therefore,
it is important to know whether the empirical rejections that are documented
in the literature are a mere consequence of some auxiliary assumptions (the
maintained hypotheses) that empiricists were forced to make, instead of a re-
flection of a failure of the general principles behind the model. Several such
auxiliary assumptions are dictated by the realities and limitations of empirical
work. Some examples are: (i) the empiricist uses a benchmark portfolio as a
measure of market risk and return that is not the true market portfolio and
perhaps not a sufficiently close proxy; (ii) the empiricist assumes that markets
are informationally efficient, in the sense that they hold unbiased beliefs at all
times; (iii) the empiricist assumes that markets are continuously in equilibrium,
i.e., that observed prices reflect equilibrium; (iv) the empiricist assumes that in-
vestors view the world as essentially static, and that their horizon coincides with
his/her observation interval. These auxiliary assumptions come on top of the
underlying basic principles and are forced upon the empiricist by tractability,
computability or mere lack of information.
Empirical rejections amount to rejections of all the assumptions, basic as
well as auxiliary. Field work cannot discriminate the causes. The role of ex-
periments, then, is to clarify whether the basics of the CAPM are more than
elegant mathematical constructions. An examination of the operations of simple
markets can help determine if the underpinnings are scientifically sound, while
at the same time revealing some of their critical aspects.
The CAPM is based on very general principles about market behavior and
clearly general principles should apply in simple and special cases. If they do
not, then they are not general. Experiments, therefore, represent an attempt
to go back to basics. By creating real, but simple markets, the operation of the
principles can be revealed apart from the auxiliary assumptions used as tools
for measurement. In this manner the foundations of the model can be studied
and the circumstances under which it might be expected to hold can be isolated
with better precision. Knowledge of relationships between model accuracy and
circumstances can lead to more successful applications in the more complex field
applications where the model is traditionally applied.
Simple markets were created that featured the major properties used by the
CAPM model. Only three assets were traded, two risky and one risk-free secu-
rity. The payoff structure of the risky assets was transparent. Each situation
was replicated several times. Markets were organized by the computerized mul-
tiple unit double auctions, which is known to successfully facilitate rapid price
discovery. Participants were drawn from the Caltech student body. All had
some rudimentary training in finance (most were participating as part of an in-
vestments class). They were generously paid for good performance (or incurred
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significant debts for bad performance).2 Therefore, in a real sense, an attempt
was made to give the CAPM the best chance of manifesting itself.
Even in this tightly controlled environment, the CAPM is not a foregone
conclusion. The model is based on an equilibrium argument: prices, demands
and supplies are revealed simultaneously and coherently, and clearing is instan-
taneous. In any realistic market situation, the process of equilibration (if it
exists at all) is gradual, with feedback effects from temporary prices to de-
mands and supplies. Moreover, the potential profits from speculation about the
price discovery process itself (i.e., where prices will move next) may entice some
individuals who would otherwise trade up to mean-variance efficient positions.
If individuals refrain from mean-variance optimization because they perceive
higher profit opportunities from the price discovery process, the CAPM would
appear to be a lost cause.
Finally, even if markets equilibrate, it is not clear that equilibrium expected
returns will solely depend on covariation with aggregate risk, which is what the
CAPM predicts. In other words, one cannot take for granted that the expected
returns increase cross-sectionally in the size of the covariation with aggregate
risk. In the CAPM, aggregate risk is measured by the return on the market
portfolio.
The experiments reported on in this paper were conducted to shed light
on these issues. Section 2 presents an overview. Section 3 provides a detailed
discussion of the experimental design. Section 4 elaborates on the predictions of
the CAPM and more general asset pricing models about the behavior of returns
in the experiments. Section 5 explains how standard tests of the CAPM were
adjusted to accommodate the unique features of experimental data. Section 6
provides a detailed report and analysis of the experimental results. Section 7
concludes. The first appendix summarizes important technical facts about the
CAPM. The second one provides the instruction sheet that was used in the
experiments.
2 Overview
The overall results are best captured by the two yardsticks that are tradition-
ally used to measure the performance of the CAPM: the difference between
the market’s Sharpe ratio and the maximum Sharpe ratio, and the intercept of
the Security Market Line (related to Jensen’s performance index). Using these
measures, we observe a prominent trend towards the CAPM. Convergence is
slow, however. Its presence becomes most evident only across sessions. Noise
obstructs the trend within experimental sessions. So, there appear to be pow-
erful forces that move the market in the direction of the CAPM, even if they
grow only gradually over time.
2The best paid subject got away with $163 for a three-hour experiment; the worst-paid
incurred $55 in debt, which was worked off at $7 per hour and through the earnings from
other experiments.
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One should not be surprised about the low speed of convergence. The CAPM
is a model about multiple markets with complementary goods (in equilibrium,
risky securities have to be held in fixed proportions, no matter how much one
decides to hold in total). The theoretical analysis of some price discovery sys-
tems (in particular, tatonnement) has long revealed that convergence may be
slow or even nonexistent in multiple markets with complementary goods.
Yet, prices stop short of the CAPM equilibrium. That is, prices settle at
a point when the market portfolio is still statistically and economically mean-
variance inefficient. Because the experiments used a complete set of markets,
one could verify that markets did not actually reach another equilibrium, by
computing implied state-price probabilities from transaction prices. These re-
flected an unacceptably high probability of arbitrage opportunities, indicating
that markets were still not in equilibrium.
We conjecture that the inability of the market to move all the way to the
CAPM equilibrium is caused by market thinness. Participants chose not to
rebalance anymore when their portfolios had moved sufficiently close to opti-
mality. This behavior is optimal, because marginal improvements in a portfolio
require one to execute trades simultaneously in at least two markets. The chosen
market architecture does not allow this. When only part of a desired portfolio
rebalancing is achieved, the portfolio may actually have moved to a position
that is dominated in mean-variance space by the status quo. Hence, partic-
ipants sometimes rationally decide not to engage in transactions that would
move them all the way to the mean-variance frontier.
Much thought was devoted to the statistical tests of the CAPM. Because the
simple experimental markets do not have many of the unknowns of naturally
occurring markets, some imagination was required. In empirical studies, the
transaction price that is observed at a particular moment in time (e.g., the clos-
ing price on the last day of a month) is treated as the actual cost of acquiring a
share. All uncertainty is attributed to the end-of-period payoff, whose distribu-
tion is unknown. In an experimental setting, the latter is known (being part of
the experimental design). Hence, it would be inappropriate to blindly apply the
statistical methodology with which one tests the CAPM in field data. In con-
trast, the market thinness of the experiments implied a substantial uncertainty
as to the true cost of acquiring a share. Hence, a statistical methodology was
built around the randomness of the acquisition cost, and not the uncertainty
about the parameters of the distribution of the final payoff.
The CAPM has rarely been the subject of experimental research. Levy
[1997], however, has recently reported results from a CAPM experiment. His
main argument in support of the CAPM is based on his observation that the
average return/beta relationship is positive, and that volatility does not pro-
vide incremental explanatory power of the cross-section of average returns. The
present paper is more demanding, by testing the prediction in the CAPM that
the average return/beta relationship is proportional, or equivalently, that the
reward-to- risk ratio (Sharpe ratio) of the market portfolio be the highest possi-
ble. At the same time, Levy’s environment is simplified substantially, by limiting
the number of risky assets to two and the number of possible states to three.
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In contrast to Levy, payoffs have nonzero correlation. By using the time-tested
continuous double auction, the price uncertainty that is inherent in Levy’s batch
market system is reduced substantially. The risk-free rate is made endogenous.
With only two risky securities, the risk-free rate plays a pivotal role in deter-
mining whether the CAPM holds. Experiments were replicated several times,
unlike Levy. Finally, the present paper uses a statistical methodology that is
better suited for experimental data than standard empirical tests.
3 Experimental Design
The main features of the experiments are summarized in Table 1. A total of
seven experiments were conducted. They are indexed by the date of the experi-
ment. Subjects were recruited from the Caltech student community. Many were
familiar with basic investment theory, including mean-variance analysis and the
CAPM, through an investment class on campus. About one-third of the sub-
jects were graduate students from the natural sciences. The remainder of the
subjects was undergraduates, mostly in their junior and senior years. Subjects
in the later experiments (5/19 and 6/9) were drawn exclusively from those who
participated earlier and were thus experienced with the experimental setting,
markets, etc. The number of subjects varied from a low of 5 (4/30 experiment)
to a high of 13 (5/13 experiment). With only five subjects, there was insufficient
trade in the riskfree security to make reliable inference, as documented below.
While the details of the experiments are outlined in the paragraphs that fol-
low, a brief summary of the setting might be useful. Each experiment consisted
of multiple replications (periods) of the same set of conditions. Three securities
were created, denoted A, B and C. They had a life of one period, at the end
of which they paid a single dividend/payoff and after which they were removed
from the system. The magnitude of the dividends depended upon a random
draw of one of three possible states, X, Y and Z. The state was drawn after
the period was closed, so during trading there was no insider or asymmetric
information in the markets. The magnitude of dividends for each of the secu-
rities and each state are in Table 1. As can be seen there, the dividend of A
varies dramatically with the state, the dividend of B varies much less, and the
dividend of C does not vary at all with the state.
All trading took place in an experimental currency called francs, which had a
known conversion rate into U.S. dollars (shown in Table 1 for each experiment).3
Each period traders were endowed with units of A and B (shown in Table 1) and
no units of security C. In addition each trader was endowed with a fixed number
of francs. It was not possible for holdings of francs, security A or security B to
go negative (no short sales) but it was possible for holdings of C to go negative.
3In the 4/30 experiment, the experimenter changed the exchange rate ex post, from 0.02
to 0.005 dollar per franc. A high number of occurences of state X led him to believe that the
(five) subjects would have been paid too generously under the original exchange rate. At the
beginning of subsequent experiments, it was explicitly announced that such ex-post changes
in the terms of payment would not be made.
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Thus, an individual could use francs to buy A and B but the ability to do so
was limited by the endowment of francs. If the individual wanted to increase
holdings of A and B beyond the implicit holdings of francs it could be done by
selling units of C and paying the dividend, which was the same for all states.
Thus, a sale of C is like borrowing. The amount of the (known) dividend will be
paid by the person who sold the unit of C to the person who bought the unit.
Of course, to the buyer the difference between the price paid and the certain
dividend is a risk free return since payment is guaranteed by the experimenter.
The price of C was determined in the market so the risk-free rate was determined
simultaneously with other rates of return.
Table 1 contains the relevant parameters for each experiment. At the begin-
ning of each period, all subjects were endowed with 400 francs and a number
of securities A and/or B. Each experiment consisted of three markets and the
dividends were identical and public. These are shown in Table 1. The three
securities had the same expected value. As can be seen, security A had a higher
variance than security B. Security C had no variance at all. The dividends were
the same in all experiments, apart from experiment 6/9, when the parameters
were changed. Except in the 6/9 experiment, subjects were always endowed
with four units of security A and security B and no units of security C (but
they could go short in security C). The probability of the states was 1/3 in all
experiments.
The parameters for experiment 6/9 differed from the other experiments in
two ways. First, the endowments differed. Three groups were formed. Each
subject in Group I was given 8 units of security A; each subject in Group II
was endowed with 8 units of security B; and the (single) subject in Group III
was endowed with the market portfolio (4 of A and 4 of B). Groups I and II
had an equal number of subjects. This way, the market portfolio consisted of
an equal number of securities A and B, as in all other experiments. Second, the
dividends were changed. While the skewness of the A security was positive in
the other experiments, it was negative in 6/9. The distribution of security B
was left unchanged, as were the expected values. The changes were made in an
attempt to increase the liquidity of the markets and to check the robustness of
results from the previous experiments.
Each period, earnings were determined as (i) the total payoff (unit dividend
times number of units, including the possibility of negative holdings of C) on
the securities in inventory at the end of the period, plus (ii) the change in cash
position of the period (i.e., end-of-period cash holdings minus the beginning-
of-period cash holdings of F400), minus (iii) a pre-determined payment for the
endowments given at the beginning of the period, namely 1500 francs. At the
end of the experiment, subjects calculated their earnings and were paid in cash.
Any subject that lost money was required to work it off. This requirement
was especially necessary because of the ability of subjects to borrow (sell C). It
was thus possible for a subject to borrow money, buy securities and then suffer
losses due to unfortunate draws of the state. In order to prevent the possibility
that such bankruptcies would destroy the integrity of the incentive system, the
subjects signed an agreement to work off losses.
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Subjects were informed that the experiments could last approximately three
hours. Once assembled at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics
and Political Science, instructions, included here as an appendix, were read to
them. Markets were organized as a computerized, continuous double auction,
employing the MUDA technology (Plott[1991]). The experiment started with a
trial period in which subjects could familiarize themselves with the technology
and procedures by buying and selling with no monetary payoff attached. When
the actual experiment started the length of each period was pre-announced and
fixed (8 minutes in all experiments, except 4/30, where it was 6 minutes). The
number of periods in the entire experiment was not pre-announced but it was
determined by the duration of the experiment, from two to three hours.
4 Outcomes Of The Experimental Environment
Predicted By Asset Pricing Theory In Gen-
eral And The CAPM In Particular
Modern asset pricing theory was developed with the aim of explaining the em-
pirical properties of returns in financial markets such as the ones described in
the previous section. It derives necessary properties for returns using a particu-
lar logical argument in which equilibrium plays a prominent role. According to
the theory, the nature of financial instruments, financial markets and investor
preferences impose special conditions on market equilibrium. The essence can
be summarized as follows. Investors demand portfolios that are optimal in a
decision-theoretic sense. Prices, and, hence, the distributional properties of re-
turns, adjust as dictated by the laws of market equilibration, so demands adjust
to meet a given supply of securities. Therefore, equilibrium prices and returns
will reflect the origin of investors’ demands, namely, the portfolio-theoretic opti-
mality. This generally implies that average returns on individual securities will
increase with covariation with aggregate risk.
While this description of asset pricing theory may leave the impression of a
sequential process, all stages are supposed to be simultaneous and instantaneous.
That is, asset pricing theory focuses on the equilibrium outcome. It is silent
about the process of equilibration, and whether the equilibrium can be reached
at all with a simple trading mechanism. Asset pricing theory exclusively studies
the characteristics of returns that result from the interaction between demand
for optimal portfolios and a given supply of securities under the assumption that
they are locked in an equilibrium relationship.
The CAPM illustrates this in a simple way. Investors demand portfolios
that are optimal in the mean-variance sense, i.e., they minimize variance for a
given mean return. At the core of the derivation of the CAPM is the mathe-
matical property that the set of mean-variance efficient portfolios is convex: any
weighted average of optimal portfolios is optimal as well. This result facilitates
the analysis of equilibrium, as follows. Investors demand mean-variance optimal
portfolios. Since the combined (aggregate) demand is a convex linear combina-
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tion of the individual demands, the aggregate demand is an optimal portfolio
as well. In equilibrium, demand must meet supply. Consequently, the portfolio
that is supplied to the market must be mean-variance optimal for equilibrium
to hold. The supply is usually referred to as the market portfolio.
Therefore, the CAPM essentially states that the market portfolio will be
mean-variance efficient in equilibrium. Mean-variance efficient portfolios are
identified with the property that the expected returns (in excess of the riskfree
rate) will be proportional to the covariance with the return on the portfolio.
Hence, in the CAPM equilibrium, mean excess returns are proportional to co-
variance with the return on the market portfolio.
Empirical studies have either focused directly on the mean-variance efficiency
of the market portfolio, or on the proportional relationship between average ex-
cess returns and covariances that this implies. The first branch of empirical work
has essentially tested whether the reward-to-risk ratio of the market portfolio
is the highest one can get in the marketplace. The reward-to-risk ratio must be
the highest possible, otherwise the market portfolio would not be mean-variance
optimal. The reward-to-risk ratio is commonly referred to as the Sharpe ratio.
Let RFt denote the return on a risk-free security in period t (we will assume
throughout that a risk-free asset exists); let Rmt be the return on the market
portfolio; let σmt denote its volatility (standard deviation). The return on the
market portfolio is viewed as a random variable and the nature of the param-
eters on this distribution are part of the auxiliary assumptions imposed by the
practical aspects of empirical work. The Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio is
defined to be
E[Rmt − RFt]
σmt
. (1)
In practice, the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio must be estimated,
and will generally be less than the maximum Sharpe ratio that was recorded
in any given period, because of sampling error. Hence, standard tests of the
mean-variance optimality of the market portfolio verify whether the difference
between the actual maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market
is statistically significant. If it is, one must reject the CAPM. We shall refer to
this test as the Sharpe ratio test, SR test. Gibbons, Ross and Shanken [1989]
is an example of an empirical study based on the SR test.
Other studies focus on the implication of mean-variance efficiency for the
relationship between mean excess returns and covariances with market returns.
The latter are usually measured indirectly, by the slope coefficients of projections
of security returns onto those of the market portfolio, referred to as “betas.”
Specifically, let Rit denote the return on security i in period t, and let Ret be
the return on a mean-variance efficient portfolio. Consider now the (orthogonal)
projection of Rit − RFt onto Ret − RFt:
Rit −RFt = αi + βi(Ret − RFt) + ²it. (2)
The portfolio with return Ret is mean-variance efficient if for all i,
E[Rit − RFt] = βiE[Ret −RFt].
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In words: there is a proportional relationship between the mean excess return on
any asset i and its “beta.” Of course, a security’s beta is merely its covariance
with the return on the optimal portfolio, divided by the latter’s variance. The
relationship is proportional, the constant of proportionality being determined
by the mean excess return on the mean-variance efficient portfolio.
The CAPM states that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient. Hence,
the CAPM implies the following restriction on equilibrium returns: for all i,
E[Rit − RFt] = βiE[Rmt − RFt]. (3)
Eqn. (3) could readily be tested by projecting excess returns of individual secu-
rities onto excess returns of the market portfolio. If the intercept (αi in (2)) is
statistically significant, the CAPM must be rejected. In fact, this test turns out
to be identical to the SR test. See Gibbons, Ross and Shanken [1989]. Instead,
tests of (3) have focused on what has become known as the security market
line (SML), namely, the plot of mean returns (now not in excess of the riskfree
rate) against market betas. Specifically, the CAPM implies that the SML is
(i) one-to-one, and (ii) linear, with (iii) intercept equal to the riskfree rate, and
(iv) a positive slope. Early tests following this route include Black, Jensen and
Scholes [1972] and Fama and MacBeth [1973]. We will refer to the second test
as the SML test.
While the CAPM can be obtained as a model of equilibrium in financial
markets only under specific assumptions about payoffs and preferences, more
general asset pricing models use analogous arguments and generate qualita-
tively similar conclusions, with the exception of Ross’ [1976] Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT). Pricing models are based on market equilibration, and invari-
ably imply that expected returns increase with the covariation with aggregate
risk. Consequently, if experiments that are meant to induce the CAPM fail to
generate evidence in its favor, the relevance of more general asset pricing models
must be questioned as well.
Our experiments were designed to provide a favorable environment for the
CAPM, i.e., to give it a “best chance.” Notice, however, that there were three
possible states. Three securities could be traded, with linearly independent
payoffs (see Table 1). Consequently, the markets were complete. This has
a major advantage, namely, that all equilibria can be characterized, whether
CAPM or not. Indeed, the complete-market structure implies the existence of a
representative agent with expected-utility preferences who supports equilibrium
prices. While it is impossible to determine the preferences of this representative
agent, in the absence of information on subjects’ preferences, prices will not
be consistent with the preferences of any representative agent if there are ar-
bitrage opportunities (Harrison and Kreps [1979]). The latter will occur when
the (unique) state-price probabilities are not strictly inside the unit interval.
Therefore, it is possible to verify that one is at any equilibrium, whether CAPM
or not, by checking that the state-price probabilities are all strictly within (0,1).
State-price probabilities are prices of securities that pay one dollar in one
state, and zero in all other, normalized such that they add up to one. State
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security prices can be implied from the prices of the securities A, B and C by
inverting the above payoff matrices.
Why do we care about equilibria that differ from the CAPM? As will be doc-
umented in Section 6, prices often did not converge all the way to the CAPM
equilibrium. This may reflect one of two phenomena: (i) the market has not
converged yet, i.e., the market is still in disequilibrium; (ii) the market has
converged to an equilibrium that is close to, yet distinct from, the CAPM equi-
librium. By checking the state-price probabilities, these two potential explana-
tions can be distinguished. Nonconvergence to the CAPM can be attributed
to the second cause only if all state-price probabilities are reliably within the
unit interval. If not, one cannot confidently conclude that any equilibrium was
reached.
Theoretically, there are reasons to expect that prices may converge to an
equilibrium that differs from the CAPM. If subjects do not have quadratic util-
ity, expected-utility maximization translates into mean-variance optimization
only if returns are normally distributed. Therefore, the resulting equilibrium,
the CAPM, would obtain only for normally distributed returns. To keep the
payoff structure as transparent as possible, however, we chose a three-point dis-
tribution. Hence, if one doubts that subjects had quadratic utility, then one
would not expect the CAPM to emerge in the first place. From this point of
view, it seems that the experimental design did not give the CAPM the best
chances to manifest itself. Normally distributed payoffs should have been used.
There is a trade-off, however, between simplicity of a three-point distribution
and the best parametrization for the CAPM to obtain. We opted for simplicity,
in order not to confuse the subjects. Moreover, the risks from participating
in the experiment were not substantial, certainly not career-threatening (nor
were they trivial). This means that a quadratic function may provide a good
local approximation of subjects’ actual preferences. If so, the CAPM would still
obtain, despite non-normalities in the payoff distributions.
Security C was risk-free and in zero net supply. Its price was not set, but
would be determined by equilibrating demand and supply. Because there was
no time value of money, the equilibrium riskfree rate will generally be zero.
Often, however, we observed a positive interest rate. That in itself would lead
one to reject equilibrium outright. However, it appeared that subjects felt cash
constrained, and, hence, started to borrow money in order to execute their
buy orders, without waiting for any sell orders to be filled. (As a matter of
fact, an understanding of this coordination effort is important to explain the
experimental results.) After that, interest rates gradually declined.
5 Determining Statistical And Economic Signif-
icance
As mentioned in the Introduction, statistical tests of the CAPM on field data
attribute all uncertainty to the final payoff. This is natural, as the parameters
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of the distribution of the final payoff are unknown. In experiments, however,
those parameters are part of the design, and, hence, it would be incoherent to
use a statistical methodology that assumes them to be unknown.
Unlike some naturally occurring financial markets, however, trade in our ex-
perimental markets was thin. This leads to a substantial amount of transaction
price uncertainty. In particular, the closing price can hardly be taken to be
representative for the cost of acquiring a share. We take this price uncertainty
as an opportunity, however, and build a statistical methodology with which we
can coherently test the CAPM on our data.
We proceeded as follows. First, the empirical distribution of the transaction
prices was constructed. A weighting scheme was used, because there was often
a clear pattern of convergence in transaction prices, so that early observations
were less representative of the average cost of a security. Early observations were
weighted less heavily. More precisely, if there were T observations in a period,
we constructed a new sample with observation t replicated max(t, T/2) times
(T even) or max(t, (T + 1)/2) times (T odd). This generates
PT
t=1 max(t, T/2)
(if T even) or
PT
t=1 max(t, (T +1)/2) (if T odd) sample points. The new sample
formed the basis for the usual (unweighted) empirical distribution. This partic-
ular scheme would generate unbiased estimates even when there is no real trend
in transaction prices. (The efficiency would be affected, though.)
Second, the weighted empirical distribution was bootstrapped. The mean of
the two hundred bootstraps was taken to be an estimate of the actual cost of a
position. From it, an estimate of the expected return was obtained by dividing
the expected payoff by the mean bootstrapped transaction price. Likewise, to
obtain an estimate of the beta of a security, we divided the covariance between
its payoff and that of the market by the bootstrap-based mean transaction
price of the security and of the market. The return volatility was estimated by
the standard deviation of the payoff divided by the square root of the average
transaction price. The riskfree rate was estimated by the payoff on the riskfree
asset divided by the mean bootstrapped transaction price.
To test the CAPM, the two approaches from the empirical literature were
used. To implement the Sharpe ratio test, the difference between the maximum
Sharpe ratio and that of the market portfolio was computed. For the SML
test, the SML was estimated from the (estimated) mean returns and betas of
the end-of-period positions of all the subjects. Confidence intervals that cover
95% of the outcomes were obtained by bootstrapping the (weighted) empirical
distribution, re-deriving the Sharpe ratio test or estimates of the parameters
of the SML two hundred times, and computing standard deviations across the
outcomes.
Under the null hypothesis that the CAPM holds, the intercept of the SML
should be equal to the riskfree rate, and its slope should be positive. The
bootstrap-based 95% confidence intervals formed the basis to decide when to
reject. One is in a less comfortable situation for the SR test, however. Absent a
theory about the distribution of transaction prices in CAPM experiments, one
cannot describe the (random) behavior of the average difference between the
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maximum Sharpe ratio and the market’s Sharpe ratio under the null that the
CAPM holds. While this may seem annoying, it is also an opportunity to use
purely economic arguments to construct a decision rule for the SR test.
Let ∆L denote the left end of the 95% confidence interval of the difference
between the maximum Sharpe ratio and that of the market. ∆H denotes the
right end. The decision rule is as follows. Reject the CAPM if ∆L > 0.05. The
volatility of the market portfolio was almost invariably close to 0.40.4 When
∆L > 0.05, there is more than 97.5% probability that an investor holding the
market portfolio could improve her return (at average transaction prices) with
2% (= 0.05 ∗ 0.40) or more, keeping volatility constant.
Why is this a reasonable economic benchmark? The 2% benchmark on
the improvement in the average return may seem marginal. However, consider
subjects who decide to hold the market portfolio. They had to pay F1500 at the
end of the experiment for a portfolio with an average payoff of F1600. Hence,
their expected income was F100. Their portfolio sold for between F1500 and
F1600 in the marketplace, which means that a 200 basis point (2%) improvement
in the average return corresponds to an additional income of between F30 and
F32, which translates to a 30-32% improvement in income. This is considered
to be large enough to reject the CAPM.
Likewise, do not to reject the CAPM if ∆L ≤ 0.05 < ∆H . Finally, state
that there is strong evidence in favor of the CAPM if 0.05 ≥ ∆H . The latter
means: “There is less than 2.5% probability that an investor holding the market
portfolio could have improved her average income with 30% or more (at average
transaction prices), keeping volatility constant.”
6 Results
Presentation and analysis of the experimental results will proceed in four steps.
Following the tradition of the experimental literature, a visual impression of the
performance of the CAPM in the experiments will be provided first. For that
purpose, a plot of the (dynamic) evolution of the difference between the maximal
Sharpe ratio and that of the market will be presented. Likewise, the evolution
of the intercept of the SML will be plotted against that of the riskfree rate. Sec-
ond, the results will be evaluated statistically and economically, ignoring any
dynamics, as if the market equilibrates instantaneously. Third, the (static) sta-
tistical and economic evaluation will be contrasted with the (dynamic) graphical
evidence, and discrepancies are interpreted as evidence of disequilibrium. That
is, convergence to other equilibria than the CAPM is ruled out. Fourth, its
is conjectured that the halted convergence is caused by market thinness. The
arguments will be substantiated by an analysis of the evolution of potential
improvements in the position of individuals and that of the market portfolio.
4This lack of variation in the volatility of the market portfolio contrasts with substantial
movements in mean returns. It is not clear why this is.
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6.1 Visual Representation Of The Experimental Results
It is standard practice in the experimental finance literature to provide plots of
the evolution of the prices of the different securities, in order to gauge evidence
of convergence. Figure 1 provides an example. It depicts the evolution of the
prices in the 5/13 experiment. As is typical in experimental financial markets,
one observes within-period convergence patterns. Across periods, however, there
are clear trends (e.g., the price of security B drifts upwards), despite the fact
that the environment remained identical.
In contrast with earlier experiments, however, the dynamics of transaction
prices cannot be plotted against clearly defined price levels that equilibrium
theory predicts. Indeed, the CAPM equilibrium does not translate into specific
equilibrium price levels, absent knowledge of subjects’ preferences. Worse, even
if subjects’ preferences are known, there are generally multiple equilibria, each
corresponding to particular price levels. See the Appendix for a discussion of
equilibrium multiplicity. So, we cannot easily interpret the evidence from plots
such as Figure 1.
Therefore, we decided to focus on metrics that unequivocally characterize
the CAPM equilibrium, namely, (i) the distance between the maximum Sharpe
ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, (ii) the intercept of the SML.
These metrics are uniquely defined in the CAPM equilibrium, unaffected by
preferences and/or multiplicity of equilibria. Except for sampling error, the for-
mer should be zero, and the latter should equal the riskfree rate. In experiments,
however, price discovery is a very apparent phenomenon. So, we must not ex-
pect initial prices to be such that the Sharpe ratio of the market is economically
an insignificant distance below the maximum Sharpe ratio; likewise, we must
not expect initial prices to generate a SML with an intercept that is statistically
insignificantly different from the riskfree rate. Rather, evidence of convergence
must be looked for. The emphasis is on dynamics, i.e., on tendencies.
To obtain the evolution of the two metrics, we proceeded as follows. At the
beginning of each period within an experiment, we wait until all three securities
traded at least once. Using the most recent transaction prices, we compute the
maximum Sharpe ratio, as well as the market’s Sharpe ratio. Likewise, we esti-
mate the intercept of the SML from an OLS regression, projecting the expected
return of individual positions onto their respective betas. Expected returns and
betas are computed on the basis of the most recent transaction prices.5 Subse-
quently, Sharpe ratio differences and SML intercepts are re-computed whenever
a new transaction takes place. When repeated across periods and experiments,
this produces a plot of the evolution of the difference between the maximum
Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market, as well as that of the intercept
of the SML.
Neither metric could be computed in the few experimental periods that one
of the securities was not traded. For instance, during several periods in the 4/30
5The procedure differs from the statistical analysis in the next subsection, where we use
average (bootstrapped) transaction prices to compute Sharpe ratios, expected returns and
betas. This methodology was explained in the previous section.
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experiment, the riskfree security (asset C) was not traded. So, no transaction
prices were recorded, and, hence, the Sharpe ratios could not be calculated. In
that case, we did not estimate the SML either, because its intercept could not
be evaluated against a riskfree rate (which would be the return on asset C).6
Figure 2 displays the dynamics of the difference between the two Sharpe
ratios. Experiments are delineated with vertical lines and labeled with the
date when they took place. The horizontal axis measures time in experimental
periods. In other words, each period within an experiment covers one unit of
time. Zero is the minimum difference between the two Sharpe ratios. Most often,
however, the market’s Sharpe ratio is below the maximum one, as suggested by
the negative Sharpe ratio differences.
Figure 2 exposes a pronounced tendency for the difference between the
Sharpe ratios to diminish over time. This is apparent within experiments, but
the trend is most manifest across the seven experiments (which were arranged
in chronological order). Because of the scale, within- period convergence is less
visible. In fact, Sharpe ratio differences often moved erratically within periods,
with no clear sign of convergence. Hence, the trend towards the CAPM is most
evident over longer time horizons.
With the 5/19 experiment, the market appears to have reached the CAPM
equilibrium. To evaluate the robustness of this finding, we altered the payoff
structure (reversing the skewness of the payoff of one of the risky securities), as
well as individual endowments (allocating only one of the two risky securities
to each subject, instead of the market portfolio), as explained in Section 3.
Figure 2 clearly suggests that this has no impact on the results: the market’s
Sharpe ratio is as close to the maximum Sharpe ratio in the 6/9 experiment as
it was in the 5/19 experiment.
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the intercept of the SML. To gain perspec-
tive, we also plot an estimate of the riskfree rate in each period. See the solid
line. This estimate is based on the average transaction prices of security C (the
riskfree security). The average is computed from two hundred draws from the
(weighted) empirical distribution. In other words, the estimate is identical to
the one that will be used in the next subsection, to evaluate the statistical and
economic significance of any deviations from the CAPM that we are observing.
While there is evidence that the intercept of the SML converges, the riskfree
rate is often not the target. In the 1/27, 4/20, 4/30 and 6/9 experiments, we do
observe convergence. While the intercept follows the trend of the riskfree rate
in the 5/13 and 5/19 experiments, it remains tenaciously too low. The reverse
occurs in the 1/18 experiment. Nevertheless, the range of the intercept contracts
gradually, with the last two experiments producing hardly any variation.
In summary:
• The evidence from Figure 2 is unequivocally in support of the CAPM,
6If the riskfree security (asset C) did not trade, all subjects could only have had a position
in risky securities. Since there are only two risky securities, the market would trivially be on
the mean-variance efficient frontier of risky assets only. Hence, the SML would fit perfectly.
See the Appendix for further discussion.
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whereas that of Figure 3 is mixed. Both figures do demonstrate conver-
gence, but they indicate that it is slow. It takes several experiments for
the range of the Sharpe ratio difference and the intercept of the SML to
decline.
The slow convergence may suggest that experience is necessary for the CAPM
to emerge (remember that the subjects in later experiments had all participated
in earlier ones). Still, a peculiarity of the CAPM may have played a role. In-
deed, in the CAPM equilibrium, risky securities are like complementary goods
(the more one wants of one, the higher the optimal investment in another).
Simple tatonnement convergence has long been known to be problematic in the
presence of complementary goods.7 Of course, our experiments were organized
as a computerized double auction, as opposed to a standard tatonnement. Nev-
ertheless, earlier experiments with computerized double auctions have produced
analogous instabilities (Plott and George [1997]). Which leads one to suspect
that complementarity may in part have caused the slow convergence in our
CAPM experiments.
6.2 Statistical Tests
Let us now turn to tests of the CAPM along standard empirical methodology.
As mentioned in Section 5, however, we do alter the methodology, because a
blind application on experimental data would be inappropriate. In particular,
we gauge statistical significance using the randomness in transaction prices, as
opposed to the randomness in final payoffs. Also, absent a clear model about
transaction price uncertainty under the null that the CAPM holds, our decisions
to reject or accept the CAPM are based on the economic magnitude of the
observed deviations.
Standard empirical methodology assumes, however, that the market is con-
tinuously in equilibrium. The plots that we discussed in the previous section
clearly indicate the presence of price discovery: while there is strong evidence
of convergence, it is implausible to hold on to the empiricist’s assumption of
continuous equilibrium. Nevertheless, we do want to generate statistics that
are directly comparable with the empirical literature. Hence, to mitigate the
impact of price discovery, we weigh early transactions in an experimental period
less heavily, along the lines of the procedure explained in Section 5. In some
experimental periods, we could not perform the tests, because transaction prices
for the riskfree security were missing.
Table 2 lists the end-points of the 95% confidence intervals for the difference
between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market, along
with our decision to reject/fail to reject/accept the CAPM (using the rule sug-
gested in Section 5). Only occasionally do we find clear acceptance (when the
entire 95% confidence interval is below 0.05). Most often, however, we observe
clear rejections. These occur when the entire 95% confidence interval is above
7H. Scarf was the first to point this out. A recent reference in this line of research is Hens
[1997].
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0.05. In economic terms, this would mean that there is a 97.5% probability
that average transaction prices are such that an individual holding the market
portfolio could improve his/her income by more than 30% (see section 5).
We emphasize the sharp contrast between the statistical evidence obtained
from standard empirical tests and the strong visual testimony of convergence
towards the CAPM equilibrium from a plot of the evolution of the Sharpe
ratio (see Figure 2). When evaluating this discrepancy, one must bear in mind
that the statistical tests assume that the market is continuously in equilibrium.
Figure 2 clearly proves this assumption wrong. We did try to accommodate
an element of price discovery by downweighing early transaction prices in each
experimental period, but this appears to be insufficient. Of course, Figure 2
demonstrates that equilibrium discovery usually takes several periods, so that
downweighing a few observations within a period won’t address the problem
adequately.
Table 3 displays the confidence intervals of the intercept of the SML, and
contrasts them with the riskfree rate. In addition, 95% confidence intervals for
the slope coefficient are provided as well. According to the CAPM, the intercept
of the SML should be equal to the riskfree rate, and its slope should be positive.
Table 3 suggests that the latter is almost never violated: with two exceptions,
the 95% confidence interval is entirely above zero. The CAPM receives far less
support from the intercept, however: the riskfree rate is often outside its 95%
confidence interval.
Again, the statistical tests in Table 3 assume that the market is continuously
in the CAPM equilibrium (although we did weigh early transaction prices less
heavily). So, the rejections could be attributed to the methodology’s inability to
capture price dynamics. In contrast, the plot in Figure 3 captures equilibrium
discovery far more aptly. Still, the evidence from Figure 3 matches the statistical
results reported in Table 3. For instance, the intercept of the SML stayed
below the riskfree rate during the entire 5/13 and 5/19 experiments. Table 3
demonstrates that the distance between the intercept and the riskfree rate over
those experiment is significant. On the other hand, Figure 3 may leave one
with the impression that the CAPM obtained in the 6/9 experiment. Yet,
Table 3 demonstrates that the distance between the intercept of the SML and
the riskfree rate was significant during the whole experiment.
In summary:
• The overall evidence from standard statistical tests is discouraging for the
CAPM. In part, this should be attributed to the inability of those tests to
capture dynamics. Indeed, they assume that the market is continuously
in the CAPM equilibrium. Figures 2 and 3 prove that this assumption is
wrong. Nevertheless, Figure 3 revealed discrepancies between the intercept
of the SML and the riskfree rate even after the market had apparently
converged. The statistical tests demonstrate that these discrepancies are
significant.
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6.3 Summarizing The Evidence And Ruling Out Other
Equilibria
Let us combine the evidence from Figures 2 and 3 with the statistical results
displayed in Tables 2 and 3. It is fair to conclude that the figures suggest strong,
even if slow, tendencies toward the CAPM equilibrium. Yet, at the same time,
the process of convergence appears to stop short of the CAPM equilibrium. This
explains the statistical rejections reported in Tables 2 and 3. One obviously
wonders what keeps the market from moving all the way to the CAPM.
The aborted convergence process suggests that the market remains in dise-
quilibrium. In other words, the market does not equilibrate. Before investigating
the causes of this disequilibrium, one does want to rule out the possibility that
markets actually converged to another equilibrium than the CAPM. That is,
whenever lack of convergence to the CAPM is observed, one must check whether
this indeed reflects disequilibrium, because markets may have settled at another
(expected-utility) equilibrium. This question is imperative in the 5/13 and 5/19
experiments, as well as the end of the 1/18 and 1/27 experiments: according to
the Sharpe ratio differences plotted in Figure 2, the market seems to have con-
verged. The evidence from Figure 3 and Tables 2 and 3, however, indicates that
the CAPM has not been reached. Maybe another equilibrium was attained?
In the experiments, a complete set of markets was used. This enables one
to reject that prices would not conform to any equilibrium configuration when
all state-price probabilities are found to be reliably inside the unit interval.
We implied state-price probabilities from the transaction prices of the three
traded securities whenever a new transaction occured. In each period, we started
computing state-price probabilities only after all three securities traded at least
once.
The behavior of the state-price probabilities in each experiment is plotted
in Figure 4. The circles indicate the values of the price probabilities of state X
(horizontal) and state Y (vertical). For these state-price probabilities to be in
the unit interval, and for the third state-price probability to be inside (0, 1) as
well, the circles have to be inside the triangles in the plots.
Except for the 6/9 experiment, the state-price probabilities frequently lie
outside the triangle, thereby violating the no-arbitrage condition and indicating
that the market cannot have been in equilibrium. Take the 5/19 experiment, for
instance. Figure 2 suggested that markets had settled, but Figure 3 and Tables 2
and 3 provided ample evidence against the CAPM. Figure 4 demonstrates that
the market had not settled at an equilibrium, because state-price probabilities
violated the no-arbitrage restriction in almost half the cases.
Figure 5 provides a better view of how the state-price probabilities evolved
over time. The price probability for state X is well behaved, fluctuating around
1/3. The price probability for state Y is often fairly high, and that for state Z
frequently moves outside the unit interval. In the 5/19, experiment, for instance,
the price probability for state Z fluctuates around zero until the last few periods,
when it moves reliably inside the unit interval. This implies that markets where
out of equilibrium for most of the 5/19 experiment. It is interesting to notice
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that the Sharpe ratio difference and the intercept of the SML in Figures 2 and 3
evolve correspondingly: both metrics suggest that the markets moved closer to
the CAPM equilibrium by the end of the experiment.
Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 2 and 3 revealed that the 6/9 experiment gener-
ated most evidence in support of the CAPM. It deserves emphasis that Figures 4
and 5 indicate that this is also the only experiment where one can clearly reject
disequilibrium: all state-price probabilities are reliably inside the unit interval.
Table 4 provides 95% confidence intervals for the three state-price prob-
abilities. These were obtained by resampling from the (weighted) empirical
distribution of transaction prices. The table confirms the visual evidence from
Figures 4 and 5: the state-price probabilities are not always reliably inside the
unit interval. The confidence intervals in Table 4 are univariate. That is, they
indicate the middle 95% of the mass of the marginal (bootstrap) density of each
state-price probability, as opposed to the middle 95% mass of the joint density
of the three state-price probabilities together. When zero or one is outside the
confidence interval, one must conclude that there is less than a 5% probability
that transaction prices imply arbitrage opportunities, thereby rejecting the hy-
pothesis that no equilibrium will support the observed prices. Of course, even if
the confidence intervals are entirely within the unit interval, markets may still
be in disequilibrium. But the fact that we tend to accept the CAPM whenenver
this occurs (see, e.g., the 6/9 experiment) proves that one can rule out this
possibility.
In summary:
• The apparent arrests in the convergence process towards the CAPM must
not be interpreted as evidence that markets actually reached another
(expected-utility) equilibrium. When these arrests occur, transaction prices
still reveal a high probability of arbitrage opportunities, which is incon-
sistent with any equilibrium whatsoever.
6.4 Interpreting Halted Convergence
Altogether, we have strong evidence that markets steadily move towards the
CAPM, but that the convergence process often stops short of the CAPM equi-
librium. One cannot interpret this as evidence that the market reaches other
equilibria, because state-price probabilities frequently reveal arbitrage opportu-
nities, indicating that markets must still be in disequilibrium.
One could be tempted to suggest that the relatively low stakes that subjects
are exposed to in the experiments lead to satisficing behavior, as opposed to full
optimization.8 In fact, a closer investigation of the costs and benefits that our
subjects faced reveals a more fundamental reason for arrests in the convergence
process, one that is fully consistent with the foundation of the CAPM, namely,
8The stakes were really not that small. As mentioned before, the subject that performed
best collected $163 (for an experiment that took about 3 hours); the worst performing subject
lost $55.
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mean-variance optimization.9
With only a limited number of subjects in the experiments, our market mech-
anism (the double auction) forces participants to actively seek out transactions
when they wish to reallocate their portfolios. This involves posting bids (if
buying) or asks (if selling) that are aggressive enough to solicit trade. Portfolio
reallocations, however, usually require one to simultaneously execute trades in
several markets. Because of the thinness of our markets, there is a fair chance
that some of the trades may not be executed, despite efforts to make the quotes
as attractive as possible. Unfortunately, the resulting portfolio may sometimes
be dominated in mean-variance space by the previous allocation. The risk of
ending up with an inferior portfolio may induce an optimizing agent not to try
to improve his/her position, refraining him/her from moving all the way to the
mean-variance efficient frontier.
This can easily be illustrated graphically. For instance, consider position X
in Figure 6. The corresponding portfolio consists of a combination of the risk-
free security (security C) and the two risky securities (securities A and B). This
portfolio is clearly dominated by the riskfree asset, which earns more despite
lower (no) risk. So, the holder may want to improve his/her portfolio’s perfor-
mance, moving towards an all riskfree portfolio, by selling the risky securities.
If, however, the holder succeeds in selling only holdings of security A, s/he moves
down in mean-variance space, towards position Y. His/her new position is dom-
inated by the old one. If she only manages to sell security B, the new position
(Z in Figure 6) is not dominated in mean-variance space by the old one, but the
holder definitely incurs more risk, which s/he may be averse to. Consequently,
the holder decides not to engage in any attempt to improve his/her position,
even if it is clearly dominated in mean-variance space. It is the transaction risk
caused by market thinness that induces a seemingly satisficing attitude.
There is more. If all subjects are content with a marginally inefficient po-
sition, one wonders how the position of the market portfolio is affected. Take,
for instance, a situation where all individuals move up to positions that are 200
basis points (2%) below the mean-variance efficient frontier, where the distance
is measured in terms of forgone mean return for a given volatility (the vertical
distance in plots like Figure 6). Would the market also be 200 basis points off
the frontier?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The market portfolio can be far inferior.
Technically, this is because convexity is lost off the frontier.10 Intuitively, the
market portfolio may be at an inferior position because it only includes the risky
securities. Figure 7 illustrates this. In both Panels in Figure 7, individuals are
positioned along a line that is 200 basis points below the mean-variance efficient
9Kroll, Levy and Rapaport [1988], however, did report experimental evidence of plain
satisficing behavior in a portfolio context: when investors were given the opportunity to
simultaneously change the allocations for several assets, they appeared not to move all the
way to full optimality.
10Roll and Ross [1994] also made this point. Remember that convexity was crucial to
derive the CAPM: individuals demand mean-variance efficient portfolios, so, by convexity,
the aggregate demand must be mean-variance efficient; in equilibrium, demand must equal
supply, and the latter is referred to as the market portfolio.
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frontier. The solid portion of the mean-variance frontier of risky securities only
(the parabola) traces the possible positions of the market portfolio. It is clear
that the market portfolio can be far more than 200 basis points below the actual
mean-variance frontier (of all securities, including the riskfree one). In fact, a
comparison of Panels A and B of Figure 7 indicates that the range of possible
positions of the market portfolio increases as investors are spread out in terms of
volatility. Since investors purchase more volatile portfolios as their risk aversion
decreases, one could re-state this as follows: the range of possible positions of the
market portfolio augments with the range of risk aversion in the marketplace.
The Appendix discusses this in more detail.
Of course, our explanation makes sense only if there is indeed a substantial
amount of price uncertainty. Figure 8 proves this. It plots the evolution of the
prices of the three securities. The plot is generated like Figures 2, 3 and 5:
transaction prices were updated after each transaction; if a security did not
trade, the previous transaction price was taken; the first observation in a period
occurs after each security traded at least once. Figure 8 reveals a high level of
transaction price uncertainty. Most of the uncertainty is concentrated in the
prices of the two risky securities, A and B.
In conclusion:
• It is perfectly consistent with optimizing behavior that subjects do not
trade all the way up to the mean-variance frontier. Transaction price
uncertainty caused by market thinness restrains them. This affects the
position of the market portfolio, which could now be far below the mean-
variance efficient frontier, even far below the position of the average sub-
ject.
The detrimental effect of seemingly satisficing individual behavior on the
position of the market portfolio does have important repercussions on standard
statistical tests of the CAPM. Remember that they test exclusively whether the
market portfolio is mean-variance efficient, either by comparing its Sharpe ratio
with the maximum one (the SR test), or by checking the properties of the SML
(in particular, whether its slope is positive, and whether its intercept equals
the riskfree rate). The tests can easily reject, even if the investors follow the
prescriptions dictated by the model, namely, mean-variance optimization.
The evidence from Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 2 and 3 support the above
description of problems caused by market thinness. On the one hand, we see
strong convergence patterns in the Sharpe ratio differences (Figure 2) and the
intercept of the SML (Figure 3). This indicates that the forces behind the
CAPM (individuals moving up in mean-variance space) are at work. On the
other hand, the figures show that the process stops short of the CAPM equi-
librium. Tables 2 and 3 corroborate this statistically. In fact, the strength of
the rejections of the CAPM could be related to the annoying property that the
market portfolio may be way below the mean-variance efficient frontier even if
most, if not all individuals are reasonably close to the frontier.
We can illustrate this reasoning in a different way. Figure 9 displays the
evolution of the potential gain for each subject in the 5/19 experiment. The
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potential gain is expressed as the difference in expected return between the
subject’s actual position and the mean-variance efficient portfolio with the same
volatility. In other words, it is the vertical distance between a subject’s position
and the frontier in plots like Figure 4. Because of its importance in tests of
the CAPM, we also plot the evolution of the potential gain for the position
taken by the market portfolio. As mentioned before, the potential gain of the
market portfolio is not necessarily a simple average of the potential gains of the
individual subjects. It can be as bad or even worse as the potential gain of the
worst performing subject, i.e., the subject that is farthest off the frontier.
Figure 9 was generated like Figures 2, 3, 5 and 8: after each transaction, the
mean- variance frontier is re-computed, and subjects’ positions (as well as that
of the market portfolio) are re-evaluated. The first observation in each period
does not reflect the first transaction; at least one transaction in each security is
needed. Unlike in Figures 2, 3, 5 and 8, however, time is measured in number
of transactions.
Figure 9 depicts how subjects gradually move up in mean-variance space.
There is a clear tendency for most individuals to decrease their potential gain
as time progresses. The convergence is not always monotonous. For instance,
in periods 1, 3 and 6, subjects’ positions become worse before improving. Also,
transaction prices sometimes move drastically against a subject’s position, lead-
ing to a sharp increase in the potential gain. Apparently, these subjects often
did not attempt much to reverse the situation. This occurs mainly when there is
little time left to trade (the end of the trading period approaches). As mentioned
before, this superficial evidence of satisficing behavior masks optimization in the
face of transaction uncertainty (market thinness).
The evolution of the potential gain of the market in Figure 9 (the plus signs)
explains why the statistical tests in Tables 2 and 3 reject the CAPM every
single period in the 5/19 experiment. The market apparently does not follow
the best performers. Most often, its potential gain is a simple average of that
of the individuals, which means that it is pulled up by the worst performing
subjects. Also, convergence of the potential gain of the market is often non-
monotonous. Hence, our simple correction of weighting early transactions less
does not work effectively to eliminate biases caused by convergence. This adds
to the significance of the statistical tests recorded in Tables 2 and 3.
Although a theoretical possibility (as pointed out earlier), we never observed
that the market’s potential gain was higher than that of the worst performing
subject. Nevertheless, individuals with high potential gains often did draw the
market’s potential gain upwards. A clear example is the last period of the
4/20 experiment. Figure 10 depicts the potential gains for that period directly
in mean-variance space, based on average transaction prices (computed on the
basis of our bootstrap, like the statistical results in Tables 2 and 3). Individual
positions as of the close of that period are indicated with circles; an arrow points
to the position of the market portfolio; one individual held the market. Only
two subjects held positions below the line through the market portfolio. Half the
subjects (four) held almost perfectly efficient portfolios. This is a nice example
of how the market portfolio is dragged down by the worst performers.
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An investigation of the evolution of potential gains in other experiments
confirmed these findings. We can summarize the evidence as follows.
• Plots of individual gains reveal ample evidence that subjects attempt to
move up in mean-variance space, in accordance with the CAPM. They stop
their quest, however, if there is insufficient time left, and, hence, when they
lack opportunities to complete all the necessary trades to improve their
portfolio. In this process, the market’s position is heavily influenced by
the worst performing subjects.
7 Conclusion
It is fair to conclude that market forces pushed prices in the experiments towards
the relationship predicted by the CAPM. The convergence process often stopped
short of the CAPM, however. One can conjecture that this is caused by market
thinness and the associated transaction uncertainty.
Lest the reader would infer otherwise, the experimental results must not be
interpreted as evidence demonstrating the validity of the CAPM in naturally
occuring markets like the NYSE. Instead, they would merely demonstrate the
soundness of the general principles of modern asset pricing theory, namely, that
(i) markets equilibrate, and (ii) in equilibrium, expected returns are solely de-
termined by covariation with aggregate risk. These principles are captured by,
among other models, the CAPM. The simplicity of CAPM’s framework makes
it amenable to experimental examination, and that is what this paper reports
on.
Demonstration that the general principles of modern finance are sound comes
at an opportune moment. This is because evidence on their validity from natu-
rally occuring markets has been mixed at best. Empirical tests of the CAPM are
a prime example. Yet, the general principles of asset pricing theory are widely
used as a basis of actual financial decision making, in areas such as portfolio
management, capital budgeting and performance analysis.
Further experiments could shed light on the role of market thinness. Re-
cently, the technology to conduct economic experiments on a larger scale has
become available. Therefore, it has become possible to extend experimentation
to much larger groups of subjects. The conjecture is that more liquid markets fa-
cilitate (equilibrium) price discovery and its investigation awaits the application
of the new technology.
Further experiments should clarify the low speed of convergence. It was
emphasized that one cannot expect equilibration to be fast. After all, the ad-
justments suggested by the CAPM are very difficult to implement. They involve
simultaneous trades in different markets. Moreover, absent common knowledge
about other subjects’ risk aversion, it is never clear a priori at what prices these
alternative markets will settle. Feedback effects on the ultimate equilibrium
from changes in the endowments during the price discovery process might exac-
erbate these difficulties. Worse, equilibrium multiplicity is a definite possibility
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and complementarities between the risky securities may impede market coordi-
nation. Of course, experiments could be designed to test the idea that various
market instruments facilitate equilibration, such as the introduction of deriva-
tive markets on baskets (indices) of risky securities. Index derivatives may play
a role beyond the one that is traditionally associated with them (in fact, theory
usually assigns no role to derivatives markets whatsoever). Namely, derivatives
could be catalysts in the price discovery process. If this is the case, then one
might expect a relationship between the presence of derivatives and the accuracy
of the CAPM in predicting outcome.
24
Appendix 1
We collect here the major facts about the CAPM that are of relevance to the
analysis of experimental data. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume
throughout that individuals demand mean-variance optimal portfolios.
We start with repeating the single main fact and its implications that have
guided empirical research.
Fact 1 In equilibrium, the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient.
As mentioned before, this result obtains primarily because of the convexity of
the set of mean-variance optimal portfolios. The following two implications have
inspired empirical research on the CAPM.
Implication 1 In equilibrium, the market portfolio has the highest possible
Sharpe ratio.
Implication 2 In equilibrium, the SML is one-to-one and linear; its intercept
equals the riskfree rate RFt and its slope is positive.
We now state an observation which is due to Nielsen [1988].
Fact 2 The model can have multiple equilibria.
This immediately leads to the following implication regarding experimental re-
sults.
Implication 3 In capital market experiments with the same subjects, the same
market and payoff configurations, prices may settle at different market Sharpe
ratios and imply different SMLs.
We did see evidence of this only in the 4/30 experiment. According to the SR
test in Table 2, mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio cannot be re-
jected in periods 1 and 7 of that experiment. Yet, prices settled at substantially
different levels. More information can be obtained by contacting the authors.
The next fact appeals to some properties of the mean-variance efficient fron-
tier. To obtain clean statements, we focus on a particular portfolio that plays
a prominent role in mean-variance analysis, namely, the minimum second mo-
ment portfolio, MSMP. The MSMP minimizes the noncentral second moment,
i.e., E[R2et], instead of the volatility. The MSMP sits on the lower part of the
mean-variance frontier. Also, let R−t denote the return on the global minimum
variance portfolio of only the risky securities.
Fact 3 If shortsales in the MSMP are allowed, then in equilibrium, RFt ≤
E[R−t ].
This can easily be proven by contradiction. If the riskfree rate is above E[R−t ],
then the mean-variance frontier without shortsale restrictions consists of com-
binations of positive positions in the riskfree security, financed by selling short
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the MSMP. Since the MSMP takes positive positions in (some or all) risky secu-
rities, but all investors prefer to short the MSMP, there is negative demand for
(some or all) risky securities. Since risky securities are in positive net supply,
the market cannot be in equilibrium.
The following implication turns the above proposition around.
Implication 4 If RFt > E[R
−
t ] in equilibrium, there must be shortsale restric-
tions.
We often observed that RFt > E[R
−
t ] in our experiments. Because there were
shortsale constraints on risky securities, this finding does not necessarily con-
tradict equilibrium.
The presence of shortsale constraints on the risky securities in the exper-
iments does not overturn the convexity of the mean-variance efficient frontier
(the crucial ingredient to derive the CAPM). However, it does reposition the
frontier.
Fact 4 If there are shortsale restrictions on the risky securities, then the max-
imum Sharpe ratio decreases as RFt increases.
This fact was taken into account in performing the SR tests to be reported
below. The result is obvious from a geometric representation of the problem.
In the experimental configuration, there were only two risky securities. Con-
sider in that case the mean-variance efficient frontier composed only of risky
securities, which we refer to subsequently as the mean-variance frontier of risky
securities. If there are only two securities, the market portfolio will always be
on the frontier of risky securities, whether the CAPM holds or not. This has
the following implications regarding the SML.
Fact 5 If there are only two risky securities, then the SML of portfolios com-
posed of only risky securities is one-to-one, and is linear, with an intercept
generally different from RFt.
Because the market portfolio is always on the mean-variance frontier of risky
securities only, (3) will hold for some choice of riskfree rate R∗Ft. If the market
is globally mean-variance efficient, then R∗Ft = RFt.
When plotting the SML on the basis of portfolios that include riskfree posi-
tions as well, however, rejections of the CAPM should become obvious.
Fact 6 If there are only two risky securities and the market portfolio is mean-
variance inefficient, then for the SML not to be one-to-one, linear, or not to
have a positive slope, portfolios with positions in the riskfree security must be
included in the plot.
The market portfolio is always mean-variance efficient relative to portfolios of
risky securities only. Hence, the SML will be one-to-one and linear. If this still
holds when the SML is constructed for all portfolios, including those containing
riskfree positions, and if its slope is positive, then mean-variance inefficiency
would be contradicted.
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We now turn to the study of convergence to equilibrium. One fact stands
out.
Fact 7 The CAPM involves complementary goods.
The CAPM is based on portfolio analysis, which studies the combination of
securities to form optimal portfolios. Optimal portfolios involve taking positions
in several risky securities. In the CAPM equilibrium, optimal portfolios have a
peculiar feature: when scaling up the risk of one’s portfolio, all positions have
to be increased simultaneously (financed by selling riskfree securities); when
decreasing the risk of one’s portfolio, the positions in risky securities have to be
simultaneously decreased, investing the proceeds in the riskfree security. Hence,
risky securities are complementary goods in the CAPM.
Little is known about convergence to equilibrium. Since optimal portfolios
consist of complementary securities, however, we can draw some conclusions
using the scarce results that are available for convergence to equilibrium for
markets with complementary goods.
Implication 5 Tatonnement convergence is expected to be slow or even non-
existent.
This follows H. Scarf’s well-known study of tatonnement convergence.11 While
the experimental markets are organized around the structure of a double auc-
tion, as opposed to tatonnement, they have generated similar instabilities. See
Plott and George [1992]. Thus, we do take Implication 5 to be suggestive of
features that we may observe in double auctions as well. And, indeed, we did
notice slow convergence in our experiments (see Figures 2 and 3).
In the CAPM theory, individuals are supposed to buy mean-variance optimal
portfolios. In practice, subjects apparently do not adjust to full optimality. This
means that subjects may settle for slightly mean- variance sub-optimal positions.
Additional gains are possible, in theory. The phenomenon can be observed
in almost all experimental markets. Usually, small trading commissions will
guarantee tight convergence. In our context, the behavior is optimal, as will be
explained later. At this point, one wonders how this affects equilibrium. The
market portfolio will obviously be mean-variance inefficient, but one wonders
how far below the frontier it may lie. In other words, what is the range of
differences between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the
market?
When there are only two risky securities, a simple result can be derived.
Assume that investors trade up to positions which are at a fixed distance in
terms of mean return (say, 2%) from the efficient frontier, keeping volatility
constant.
Fact 8 Assume investors settle for portfolios that are a fixed (vertical) distance
from the mean-variance efficient frontier. As the range of investors’ risk aver-
sion increases, the range of potential differences between the maximum Sharpe
ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market increases as well.
11See Hens for a recent attempt to address the problem.
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A geometric argument supports the claim. An investor’s sub-portfolio of only
risky securities is located at the intersection between a line through the risk-
free rate and the investor’s actual position (including riskfree securities), and
the mean-variance frontier of risky securities. As the range of risk aversion in-
creases, the range of preferred volatilities increases, and, hence, the section of
the mean- variance frontier of risky securities that individuals invest in enlarges.
Since the market portfolio is an aggregate of individual holdings (convex linear
combination), it must be somewhere on this section. As the section enlarges,
the range of potential differences between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the
Sharpe ratio of the market increases as well.
Figure 7 illustrates the argument. In Panel A, the range of risk aversion
is low, indicated by the short range of volatilities that investors settle for; the
section of the mean- variance frontier of risky securities where the market could
be is commensurately small. Panel B displays a case where the range of risk
aversion is large. The section of the mean-variance frontier of risky securities
where the market could be is correspondingly large.
Notice that the argument does not depend on the number of individuals in
the market. Only the range matters. One could refine it if the distribution of
risk aversion is known.
Simple graphical examples should convince one that the differences between
the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market can be quite sub-
stantial when the range of risk aversion is high. Conversely, when risk aversion
does not differ across individuals, everybody will eventually hold the market
portfolio, and, hence, the difference in Sharpe ratios is constrained by the fact
that individuals trade up to a certain distance below the frontier.
Let us return to the question why individuals are not fully (mean-variance)
optimizers. In our experimental context, there is a plausible reason. Marginal
improvements in a portfolio require one to execute trades simultaneously in at
least two markets, which our market architecture does not allow. For instance,
consider the portfolio that is located at the left end of the solid line 2% below
the frontier in Panel B of Figure 7. This portfolio is dominated in mean-variance
space by the riskfree security. So, the holder may improve her portfolio’s per-
formance by selling all holdings of both risky securities. But this is not an easy
task: if the holder manages to sell only holdings of security A, (s)he moves down
in mean-variance space. In other words, the new position is dominated by her
old one! If (s)he only sells security B, the new position is not dominated by
the old one, but it involves higher risk, which may not be preferred. In this
sense, satisfying behavior is in fact optimal in view of the trading uncertainties
imposed by our market structure. Hence:
Fact 9 Inability to simultaneously trade in multiple markets leads fully rational
investors to settle for suboptimal portfolios.
Facts 8 and 9 demonstrate that the forces that move market prices towards
the CAPM equilibrium may not be strong enough, even when all investors are
mean-variance optimizers. The forces appear to depend on the range of risk
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aversion across investors and on the degree of synchrony across markets. The
latter is, of course intimately related to market thinness.
Appendix 2
Instruction Sheets. Attached to the back of the paper.
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Table 1
Experimental Design Data
Experiment Subject Endowments Payoff Per State $/F
Category A B C A B C
(Number) X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z
1/18 I (12) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
1/27 I (10) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.02
4/20 I (8) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.02
4/30 I (5) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.005
5/13 I (13) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
5/19 I (11) 4 4 0 475 50 75 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
6/9 I (4) 8 0 0 275 50 275 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
II (4) 0 8 0 275 50 275 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
III (1) 4 4 0 275 50 275 125 275 200 200 200 200 0.03
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Table 2
Sharpe Ratio (SR) Tests Of The CAPM
Experiment ∆L ∆H Choice Experiment ∆L ∆H Choice
and Period and Period
1/18 1 0.05 0.12 0 4/30 1 0.01 0.07 0
2 0.01 0.34 0 4 0.04 0.06 0
3 0.01 0.07 0 5 0.06 0.14 –
4 0.34 0.48 – 6 0.12 0.48 –
5 0.22 0.24 – 7 0.01 0.20 0
6 0.06 0.23 – 8 0.14 0.26 –
7 0.24 0.27 – 5/13 1 0.00 0.07 0
8 0.11 0.19 – 2 0.18 0.22 –
9 0.17 0.20 – 3 0.12 0.17 –
10 0.07 0.10 – 4 0.10 0.15 –
11 0.12 0.15 – 5 0.14 0.19 –
1/27 1 0.75 1.26 – 6 0.17 0.20 –
2 0.06 0.22 – 7 0.15 0.18 –
3 0.17 0.23 – 8 0.13 0.16 –
4 0.19 0.27 – 5/19 1 0.13 0.17 –
5 0.13 0.22 – 2 0.15 0.18 –
6 0.16 0.56 – 3 0.14 0.16 –
7 0.19 0.24 – 4 0.14 0.17 –
8 0.02 0.08 0 5 0.15 0.18 –
9 0.11 0.22 0 6 0.17 0.18 –
10 0.00 0.05 + 7 0.12 0.14 –
11 0.04 0.15 0 8 0.10 0.12 –
12 0.00 0.06 0 9 0.11 0.14 –
4/20 1 0.03 0.25 0 6/9 1 0.07 0.09 –
2 0.02 0.12 0 2 0.10 0.11 –
3 0.15 0.21 – 3 0.05 0.09 0
4 0.00 0.02 + 4 0.03 0.09 0
5 0.00 0.04 + 5 0.03 0.08 0
6 0.35 0.38 – 6 0.02 0.06 0
7 0.08 0.28 – 7 0.00 0.02 +
8 0.06 0.10 –
Remarks: Choice: – if reject CAPM (∆L > 0.05), 0 if fail to reject CAPM
(∆L ≤ 0.05 < ∆H), + if strong evidence in support of CAPM (∆H ≤ 0.05). ∆L
and ∆H are the lower bound and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval of
the difference between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the
market, respectively. Confidence intervals are estimated by bootstrapping from
the (weighted) empirical distribution of transaction prices.
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Table 3
Security Market Line (SML) Tests Of The CAPM
Experiment RFt Intercept Slope Experiment RFt Intercept Slope
and Period Low High Low High and Period Low High Low High
1/18 1 0.2 1.3 2.2 1.4 1.8 4/30 1 4.0 1.4 2.5 0.9 2.7
2 4.3 7.8 9.2 5.6 6.6 4 4.5 1.9 2.8 1.2 3.3
3 8.3 6.7 8.1 3.3 5.0 5 5.0 -2.3 1.5 6.3 7.3
4 4.2 10.5 12.0 16.2 18.9 6 10.0 -1.3 -0.3 7.7 8.6
5 0.7 6.2 6.6 11.1 11.8 7 6.7 1.4 6.6 2.2 7.2
6 1.9 5.6 6.2 8.6 9.1 8 9.0 -2.0 0.4 8.1 9.8
7 0.6 6.2 6.7 17.4 18.9 5/13 1 6.2 3.4 5.1 4.9 5.9
8 1.2 5.2 6.1 20.2 20.7 2 9.8 1.1 2.6 2.6 3.4
9 1.0 5.2 5.8 19.7 20.7 3 7.5 0.2 1.7 4.9 6.6
10 2.0 5.2 6.0 14.6 15.9 4 8.7 2.4 4.3 8.1 10.0
11 0.5 4.2 5.0 11.3 12.4 5 6.3 -2.4 -0.5 7.2 8.1
1/27 1 1.6 13.5 22.6 -0.3 3.2 6 7.0 -1.6 -0.5 7.1 7.6
2 1.9 3.3 5.5 2.4 3.2 7 5.6 -3.7 -2.6 8.0 9.2
3 1.5 5.3 6.0 11.8 12.7 8 5.4 -1.2 0.0 8.5 9.0
4 1.1 6.8 8.3 18.4 20.1 5/19 1 5.8 -1.0 0.0 3.6 4.1
5 2.2 6.6 7.8 18.5 19.3 2 4.1 -2.3 -1.9 5.0 5.5
6 1.1 6.1 12.3 21.7 22.6 3 4.5 -3.7 -3.4 9.1 9.5
7 1.7 6.7 8.1 12.3 14.9 4 3.3 -4.7 -3.7 5.3 7.4
8 2.3 3.5 4.3 3.6 4.8 5 3.7 -5.0 -4.2 6.5 7.7
9 2.1 6.0 8.2 15.3 16.8 6 4.2 -5.8 -5.4 7.9 8.2
10 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.2 5.7 7 2.8 -4.5 -4.1 6.6 7.3
11 2.1 3.3 4.7 0.5 1.3 8 3.7 -3.3 -1.3 8.0 8.4
12 3.0 1.3 2.1 -0.8 -0.3 9 4.7 -1.8 -1.1 7.6 8.3
4/20 1 4.5 7.1 11.8 16.2 23.5 6/9 1 2.5 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.8
2 7.1 2.7 5.2 2.3 4.9 2 2.5 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6
3 9.4 1.9 2.7 0.8 3.0 3 1.9 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.6
4 4.6 4.3 5.0 2.5 3.4 4 1.9 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.9
5 5.4 4.3 5.4 2.9 4.1 5 2.0 0.9 1.2 0.2 0.4
6 0.7 5.7 6.0 5.5 6.2 6 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6
7 5.2 8.0 10.9 4.7 5.9 7 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
8 2.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
Remarks: The riskfree rate (RFt) is an average based on two hundred bootstraps from the
(weighted) empirical distribution of transaction prices. “Low” and “High” are the lower bound
and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval of the intercept and slope of the OLS fit of the Se-
curity Market Line (SML), respectively. Confidence intervals are estimated by bootstrapping from
the (weighted) empirical distribution of transaction prices. The riskfree rate, intercept and slope of
the SML are all expressed in percentage points.
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Table 4
State-Price Probabilities: 95% Confidence Intervals
Experiment State X State Y State Z Experiment State X State Y State Z
and Period Low High Low High Low High and Period Low High Low High Low High
1/18 1 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.43 4/30 1 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.46 0.21 0.32
2 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.32 0.41 0.62 4 0.30 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.21 0.27
3 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.50 0.21 0.33 5 0.28 0.29 0.49 0.64 0.07 0.23
4 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.74 0.82 6 0.27 0.39 0.62 1.30 -0.69 0.12
5 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.63 0.65 7 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.72 -0.02 0.40
6 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.30 0.48 0.61 8 0.26 0.30 0.67 0.91 -0.22 0.07
7 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.69 0.73 5/13 1 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.51 0.20 0.37
8 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.63 0.68 2 0.33 0.35 0.70 0.80 -0.14 -0.04
9 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.66 0.69 3 0.29 0.32 0.61 0.70 -0.01 0.10
10 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.29 0.55 0.59 4 0.24 0.27 0.57 0.66 0.07 0.18
11 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.56 0.59 5 0.27 0.29 0.66 0.76 -0.05 0.06
1/27 1 0.21 0.24 -0.32 -0.04 0.80 1.10 6 0.28 0.29 0.72 0.78 -0.07 0.00
2 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.42 0.51 7 0.27 0.29 0.67 0.73 -0.02 0.06
3 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.60 0.63 8 0.25 0.26 0.64 0.72 0.03 0.11
4 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.67 0.74 5/19 1 0.31 0.33 0.61 0.68 -0.01 0.08
5 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.63 0.70 2 0.29 0.30 0.67 0.71 -0.01 0.04
6 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.68 0.91 3 0.26 0.27 0.65 0.71 0.02 0.09
7 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.61 0.67 4 0.28 0.32 0.65 0.70 -0.02 0.07
8 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.40 0.46 5 0.29 0.30 0.67 0.72 -0.02 0.04
9 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.27 0.59 0.67 6 0.29 0.29 0.70 0.73 -0.03 0.01
10 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.43 0.27 0.44 7 0.27 0.29 0.61 0.65 0.07 0.12
11 0.30 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.38 0.45 8 0.26 0.27 0.57 0.62 0.11 0.17
12 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.44 0.20 0.34 9 0.27 0.28 0.60 0.64 0.08 0.13
4/20 1 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.33 0.54 0.73 6/9 1 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.41
2 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.59 0.08 0.29 2 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.43
3 0.31 0.34 0.68 0.77 -0.11 0.01 3 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.41
4 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.39 4 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.40
5 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.26 0.39 5 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.40
6 0.24 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.61 0.64 6 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.39
7 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.47 0.59 7 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.34
8 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.39 0.42
Remarks: State-Price Probabilities are inverted from transaction prices. Confidence intervals are estimated by
bootstrapping two hundred times from the (weighted) empirical distribution of transaction prices.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the prices of the three securities (A, B and C) in the
5/13 experiment. Time is measured in periods. Vertical bars delineate periods.
Prices are updated whenever there is a new transaction. The first observation
in a period is computed only after each security traded at least once.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the difference between the maximum Sharpe ratio and
the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. The theoretical maximum difference
is zero. Time is measured in periods. The date of an experiment is indicated
between the vertical bars that delineate it. Sharpe rate differences are updated
whenever there is a new transaction. The first Sharpe ratio difference in a period
is computed only after each security traded at least once. Periods when one of
the securities did not trade are left empty.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the intercept of the security market line (SML) (asterisks)
and the riskfree rate (solid lines). In the CAPM equilibrium, these should be
equal. Time is measured in periods. The date of an experiment is indicated
between the vertical bars that delineate it. Intercepts are updated whenever
there is a new transaction. The first intercept in a period is computed only
after each security traded at least once. Periods when one of the securities
did not trade are left empty. The riskfree rate is estimated on the basis of
200 bootstraps from the empirical distribution of the transaction prices of the
riskfree security in each period.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the state-price probabilities of state X (horizontal axis)
and state Y (vertical axis) in each experiment. In equilibrium, these state-price
probabilities should lie strictly inside the triangle. State-price probabilities are
implied from the transaction prices of securities A, B and C, and are re-computed
whenever there is a new transaction.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the state-price probabilities for the three states (X, Y
and Z). In equilibrium, all state-price probabilities should lie strictly inside the
interval [0,1] (betweenhorizontal dotted lines). Time is measured in periods.
The date of an experiment is indicated between the vertical bars that delineate
it. State-price probabilities are implied from the transaction prices of securities
A, B and C, and are re-computed whenever there is a new transaction. The first
state-price probability in a period is computed only after each security traded
at least once. Periods when one of the securities did not trade are left empty.
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Figure 6: An investor who holds position X may want to move to point C,
because it has a higher return and lower (no) risk. Since X consists of a com-
bination of the positions A, B and C, both A and B have to be liquidated and
additional units of C have to be bought. If the investor manages only to sell
A, (s)he moves down to position Y, which is dominated by the original position
(X). If (s)he can only sell B, (s)he moves to Z, which has higher expected return,
yet is more volatile.
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Figure 7: Graphical illustration of the effect of the range of risk aversion (low in
Panel A; high in Panel B) on the possible position of the market portfolio when
all individuals locate on a line 200 basis points (2%) below the mean-variance
frontier. Individuals are positioned on the solid straight line below the (global)
mean-variance efficient frontier. The market portfolio will be located anywhere
on the solid section of the mean-variance frontier of the two risky securities only.
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Figure 8: Evolution of the prices of the three securities (A, B and C). Time is
measured in periods. The date of an experiment is indicated between the vertical
bars that delineate it. Prices are updated whenever there is a new transaction.
The first observation in a period is computed only after each security traded at
least once. Periods when one of the securities did not trade are left empty.
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Figure 9: Evolution of potential gains on individual positions (dots) and the
market portfolio (pluses) in the 5/19 experiment. Potential gains are defined
as the increase in expected return one obtains from moving up to the mean-
variance frontier, keeping volatility constant. Time is measured in transactions.
Vertical bars delineate periods. Potential gains are updated whenever there is a
new transaction. The first potential gains in a period are computed only after
each security traded at least once.
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Figure 10: Portfolio space in period 7 of the 4/20 experiment, based on average
transaction prices that were bootstrapped from the (weighted) empirical distri-
bution. Circles depict the positions of the 8 subjects at the end of the period.
One subject held the market portfolio. Only two subjects had a higher potential
gain (vertical distance to the mean- variance efficient frontier) than the market
portfolio.
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